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The eternal question in European integration research is: who are the drivers of European
integration? In this thesis, I investigate this question closer by examining the relationship between the
member states and the Court of Justice of the European Union, an EU institution for which the authority, as
well as the importance, has increased drastically over the past three decades. Specifically, I examine how
the member states interact with the Court and ask if member states influence it using judicial appointment.
I make use of two datasets: the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) for government position on European
integration and Naurin et. al. (2013) on outcomes in the Court between 1997 and 2008. Using these
datasets, I match the appointing governments’ position on European integration to the active judges in the
CJEU and compare the outcome for or against European integration. The investigation finds only a weak
correlation between government European integration position and outcome in the Court for or against
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One of the most important EU institutions is the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In
the Court, seemingly small decisions have broad, long-term consequences for European individuals,
businesses, and government institutions. The Court’s influence on Europeans lives is not only comparable
to that of the European Commission but also the national governments. Due to this importance, it is
paramount that the CJEU is as independent and not politicized as described in the EU Treaties. The Treaty
of Rome mandates the members of the Court to be ”independent beyond doubt” (Treaty of Rome, 1957).
This thesis takes a closer look at the CJEU and its judges, and the connection between judges’
decision-making in the CJEU and the member states’ political positions. I ask to what extent member states
employ ”court-curbing mechanisms” that can constrain Court rulings to reflect the member states’
preferences. One of the chief mechanisms available to member states is their control over the appointment
of judges, and this will be the focus of my analysis. In particular, I will examine to what extent court
rulings appear to reflect the preferences of the member state governments that appointed them in the period
from 1997 to 2008.
The 1997-2008 period covers a time with considerable member state discretion over the
appointment of judges. Each judge in the CJEU was selected directly by the individual member state, and
in most member states, this happened without parliamentary involvement. As there were few democratic
checks and a judge potentially has a large impact on a court decision, member state governments had the
opportunity to select judges that match their preferences and ”pack” the court with judges who rule in line
with member state governments’ preferences. Hence, this sets up a most likely case scenario to find
court-curbing: if it is true that member states use their considerable appointment power to constrain court
behavior, we should detect it in this period.
Indeed, the rules on the appointment of CJEU judges were changed in 2010. A selection panel
composed of seven evaluators from both European and national courts is now evaluating the competence
and suitability of a member state’s judicial nominee to the CJEU, and this has reduced the individual
discretion of a member state government over appointment. The reported reason for this rule change was to
remedy some potential issues with the previous appointment process and to: ” [...] put the mechanism of
judicial appointments at a proper distance from the political heat and power games” (Sauvé, 2015, p. 79).
The Panel’s role is thus to act as an unbiased evaluator of the competence and suitability of the member
state governments’ judicial appointments to the CJEU.
So, to what extent did member states use their appointment power to influence CJEU rulings under
the pre-2010 regime? I will investigate this by matching the ideological positions of appointing
governments to their respective judge and compare decisions for or against European integration depending
on the composition of judges in the chambers making decisions.
My research contributes to a broad literature on control mechanisms used by member states to
constrain Court outcomes. This literature generally distinguishes between three forms of control. Judicial
override: member states can use their treaty-making power to override judicial rulings (Larsson & Naurin,
2016, Caruba, Gabel Hankla, 2012); member state non-compliance: member states can refuse to comply
with court decisions; and judicial appointment: member states can use their nomination authority over who
sits in the Court to control or curb the Court. For example, it is widely known that the composition of
judges in the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) affects how the US Constitution is interpreted.
Contrary to the SCOTUS, some scholars argue that court decisions in the CJEU are largely
unaffected by the composition of the judges. For example, Kelemen (2012) argues that the composition
and organization of the CJEU are what protects it from court-curbing mechanisms that could affect court
decisions. However, some scholars argue that the CJEU has been affected by political control mechanisms
and that the judicial selection and reappointment to the CJEU may mirror the political stance of the
government in the same way as it does in the SCOTUS (Frankenreiter, 2017; Frankenreiter, 2018;
Holmgren & Naurin, forthcoming).
The thesis proceeds as follows. Following the introduction is a section on the theoretical
perspectives on the Court focusing on the principal-agent theory and Weiler’s ”Exit and Voice” theory of
integration. Research on the Court has combined legal theories and political science theories in an attempt
to shed light on the CJEU’s role in European integration. For my purposes, the relationship between the EU
institutions and the member states is at the center of this thesis, and a useful starting point is Weiler’s ”Exit
and Voice” model of the member state-EU relationship. Thus, the theory section will begin with
perspectives on European integration. The theory proceeds by describing the theory on judicial control
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mechanisms and what scholars have found on the subject, covering judicial override, judicial
non-compliance, and judicial selection, with a specific focus on the latter. Next comes the theory of the
CJEU. The section covers the basic facts about the Court, including its development and role in the
European project, and then goes on to cover judge’s role in decision-making. Following the section on
theory, the take-aways from the theory summarize what insights the theory has provided. Following that is
a description of the hypotheses followed by the empirical analysis section, which describes the design, the
method ordered logistic regression, and the three datasets key for this analysis. The results are described




2.1 European Law, Judicial Revolution, and Member State Voice
Since the founding of the EU, scholars have argued over who is the driver of European integration. What
scholars agree on is that the European integration process is driven by the relationship between the EU
institutions and the member states. A useful perspective to examine this member state-EU relationship is
the principal-agent model. The perspective problematizes how the principals (member states) delegates
power to agents (the EU institutions) (Pollack, 2003). It highlights the trade-offs that the principals face.
On the one hand, the delegation of power from member states to the EU can be beneficial because it
increases the effectiveness of policymaking by lowering the transaction cost of intergovernmental
bargaining and policymaking. It addresses the problem of collective action, implements
’impartial/unbiased’ regulation, and solves disputes emerging from the cooperation of sovereign states. On
the other hand, by delegating authority to an agent, the member states transfer a piece of their sovereignty
to the EU. The risk of transferring sovereignty is that the agent may develop its own preferences, which
could be different from the principals’. If the agent starts pursuing its own goals, this comes at the
collective cost of the principals and the principals may lose control over the agent. The perspective thus
connects intergovernmentalism, a theory that puts member states as drivers of European integration
(Moravcsik, 2013), and neofunctionalism, a theory that puts the EU institutions as drivers of European
integration (Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 1998). The question that contrasts these two perspectives is: by
delegating power to the EU, do the member states have control over the integration process or has the
agent, the EU, developed its own preferences that it is pursuing at a sovereignty cost for the principals?
Thus, the relationship between the principals and the agent is defined by the struggle of the principals
trying to maximize their control over the agent to minimize their loss of sovereignty.
One way to provide a historical perspective on this principal-agent dynamic as pertaining to the
CJEU is through Weiler’s theory of European integration ”Exit and Voice”. Weiler’s theory suggests a
rationale for why member states might want to use their appointment power for political control. Weiler
observed that the European Community had developed from limited cooperation between states to a giant
international actor involved in matters ranging ” [..] from the trivial and ridiculous to the important and
sublime” (Weiler, 1991, p. 2405). In Weiler’s theory, the CJEU is at the center of this development.
From its founding, the CJEU has evolved from a low-key institution with little legislative power to
a powerhouse of legislation. The CJEU was one of the original EU institutions drafted in the first EU treaty.
The main function of the Court was defined in the Treaty of Rome, article 164 as ”[ensuring] that in the
interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed”. While this has remained the main
function, the CJEU’s authority has expanded since its founding. Weiler (1991) writes that the increased
authority of the CJEU mainly comes down to two factors: politicians and national courts. Alter (1998)
illustrates how politicians and national courts have worked in tandem to establish the CJEU’s precedence.
Alter (1998) writes that the CJEU has managed to expand its power due to the different time perspectives
of politicians and judges. Politicians allowed an expansion of CJEU authority to, in the short term, avoid
costs that would be imposed should the politicians go against the CJEU. In general, politicians are more
concerned about protecting national interests than controlling judicial activism in the Court. Short-term
material gains of CJEU decisions are more important than the long-term political/judicial consequences of
’activist’ decisions in the Court. In other words, the member state governments are fine with the CJEU
using EU law in a way that it was not intended as long as it benefits their short-term political goals.
In addition to politicians, national courts have played an important role in establishing the
European law as supreme over national legislation. Alter (1998) uses a case from Germany regarding
turnover tax called the Lütticke decision as an example of how European law was established as supreme
over national1. In 1966, a decision in the Court that ruled a collection of a German tax illegal sparred a
flood of reclaim applications to the German authorities. Following this, the German Finance Ministry
deemed the CJEU decision invalid and instructed tax courts to ignore the CJEU’s ruling. However, the
German courts refused to follow the instructions from the Finance Ministry causing a judicial tumult in
Germany. Later, the Lütticke case was challenged by the German Ministry of Economics claiming the
reclaimers’ legal case rested on the incorrect interpretation of EU law, an argument that was accepted by
the CJEU. Yet, since national courts had refused to follow instructions from their government and rather
1For a full account of the Lütticke case, see Alter (1998)
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enforced the CJEU ruling, and additionally, the German Ministry of Economics had challenged the case in
the CJEU, the Lütticke case had established CJEU precedence. This is an example of when the short-term
perspective of politicians worked in tandem with the national courts to benefit the CJEU. The national
courts’ defense of the supremacy of EU law by opposing attempts by politicians to disregard CJEU rulings
forced politicians to play by legal rules. The Lütticke case had thus established the legal realm as the main
game and European law as supreme (Alter, 1998).
The result of European law supremacy is a legal system that limits the member states’ sovereignty.
European law has grown stronger and Weiler (1991) theorizes that the possibility to diverge from EU
legislation has become limited. When member states sign EU legislation, they can no longer ”exit” from
EU law when it suits them, as shown above in the Lütticke case. As that possibility has decreased, Weiler
(1991) argues that the member states have demanded a stronger ”Voice”. In other words, the developments
in the EU legal realm have made member states more and more constrained by EU law. As a response,
Weiler writes that the member states have started to ensure that they have enough say in EU matters.
Member states now use other tools to push for their agenda and express their preferences through the EU
institutions. Similarly to the principal-agent theory, the main argument is that this struggle between ”exit”
(the ability to deviate from EU law) and ”voice” (the ability to control EU law) is what drives the
development of the European Community. Having explained how the expansion of European law has
closed the ability of member states to deviate from European law, I will now further examine the member
states’ methods of expressing ”voice”.
2.2 Judicial Control Mechanisms
In the previous section, it was concluded that the expansion of EU law through the CJEU limits the choice
of ”exit” for the member states and that member states struggle to gain more ”voice”. In the following
section, I will argue that one way to express ”voice” is through court-curbing mechanisms defined as:
mechanisms through which political actors can influence courts to make judgments that do not diverge
excessively from the political actors’ preferences (Kelemen, 2012, p. 44). The following section closely
examines court-curbing mechanisms as a type of ”voice” of the member states in the relationship with the
CJEU. The main argument in the following section is that the structure and functions of court-curbing
mechanisms are potential tools for the member states to express ”voice”.
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The following paragraphs outline the main control mechanisms used in the context of the CJEU.
Scholars have identified three potential court-curbing mechanisms the member states can use to constrain
the Court: judicial override, judicial non-compliance, and judicial appointment. The first mechanism,
judicial override, is a process by which the member states use their legislative power through the other EU
institutions to change EU legislation to sterilize previous Court decisions (Carruba, Gabel, & Hankla, 2012;
Pollack, 2003; Larsson & Naurin, 2016). Alternately, member states can override legislation by creating
secondary legislation in the form of member state exceptions. These exceptions are negotiated in the
Commission, the Council, and Parliament with little input from the CJEU (Garrett, Kelemen, & Shultz,
1998). However, the effectiveness of judicial override as a control mechanism is questioned mainly due to
three reasons. First, cooperation in the Council of Ministers is difficult to achieve. Depending on the area
of legislation and type of legal act, decisions in the Council are determined through either simple majority,
qualified majority, or unanimity. Coordinating a vote though each of these voting procedures requires
considerable political effort. Therefore, changing legislation is difficult and uncertain in practice, and rarely
worth the effort for individual member states (Stone Sweet and Brunell, 2012). Second, any legislation
passed requires agreement in the Council of Ministers, and approval from the European Parliament. This
shared legislative competence between the member states and the European Parliament is called the
”joint-decision trap” (Scharpf, 1988). In practice, the joint decision trap refers to the institutional design of
EU decision-making where the Council shares legislative authority over EU legislation with the European
Parliament. The Council, where the member states are represented directly, is only one of the two
legislative bodies in the EU. With the European Parliament having different preferences from the Council,
achieving unanimity in the Council and coordination with the European Parliament may come at a too high
cost for the member states relative to the gains (Kelemen, 2012). Third, the impact of court decisions is
rarely symmetrically detrimental to all member states and the salience of Court decisions cannot be
expected to be the same in all member states which further complicates coordination. For these reasons, it
is unlikely that judicial override is used by member states as a control mechanism. As an alternative,
scholars argue that it is more likely that member states block rather than change legislation.
The second mechanism is judicial non-compliance e.i. the refusal of member states to follow
decisions from the Court. Again, the efficacy of this mechanism has been questioned by scholars and is
divided into the perspective of the Court and the member states. First, generally, scholars agree that
non-compliance damages the legitimacy of the Court because the legitimacy of the Court is dependent on
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its capability of ruling without any political agenda and strictly in accordance with the law (Mattli &
Slaughter, 1998). Any ruling that strays from the logic of the law may be considered as a political act and
may be illegitimatized by legal scholars and experts and contested by member states (Garrett, 1992).
Therefore, if the Court would pursue its own agenda it is limited by the strictly legal interpretation of the
treaties: ”the Court is constrained to pursue its institutional or policy preferences within the limits of
carefully reasoned legal analysis.” (Pollack, 2003, p. 20). In other words, rulings that go against the
majority interpretation risk the legitimacy of the Court and may also make the member states limit the
power of the Court. It is therefore unlikely (but not impossible) that the Court would make a decision that
so detrimentally goes against the member states’ legal interpretation that member states decide to not
comply. Second, Garrret (1992) shows that in its legal arena, the use of non-compliance by member states
is transparent and open. If a member state does not comply the system is responsive and will bring
offenders to justice. Member states are effective in applying this mechanism that deters non-compliance.
Furthermore, Pollack (2003) writes that the cost of non-compliance is generally too high. Non-compliance
can not only result in monetary costs such as fines and ’state liability’, but also damage member state
reputation. A single member state attempting to non-comply is thus ineffective. This is what makes them
comply with EU law. For these reasons, the use of non-compliance is debated as an efficient control
mechanism.
The final control mechanism is judicial appointment. Through the judicial appointment, there is an
opportunity for the member states to select judges that advocate for their position in the Court. There are
two ways in which judicial appointments can influence the Court. First, a member state can actively
instruct a judge on matters e.i. appointing a corrupt judge. Second, the member states can select judges that
have expressed an interpretation of EU jurisprudence in line with the preferences of the ruling government.
Reasonably, in the case of the CJEU, the latter is more likely because selecting a corrupt judge comes with
a higher political risk. This is further highlighted since the judge mandate can be renewed by member state
giving the judges incentives to favor its home government. This is comparable to appointments to
SCOTUS where there is a clear distinction between liberal and conservative judges.
The member states have the power to appoint a judge to the CJEU through article 223 of the Treaty
establishing the European Community. The appointment is ”[dependent] exclusively on the will of one
single government, namely that one which proposed the candidate” and the appointment process was built
on ”mutual trust” (Sauvé, 2015, p. 79). Thus, in practice, it is the ruling government alone that selects a
8
judge to the CJEU. The selection has had no democratic checks since in most member states, the
appointment has not been overlooked. Furthermore, while member states can question each other’s
selection, a member state’s appointment has never been contested. As a result of few democratic checks,
the member state governments have the ability to pack the Court with judges that rule in line with member
state governments’ preferences. One might argue that this adds to the democratic deficiency of the EU and
that a democratic check through the national or European parliament might further strengthen EU
democracy. However, some scholars argue that member states have not taken advantage of the judicial
appointments to affect the Court (Dehousse 1998; Beach, 2001).
The following section sums up this section on control mechanisms. Generally, the literature on the
effectiveness of member state control mechanisms on the CJEU is divided. Some scholars argue that
member states use these controls to ensure their preferences are met in the Court (Carruba, Gabel, &
Hankla, 2012; Larsson & Naurin, 2016). Others argue that there is no convincing evidence that shows that
the CJEU and the European Commission work together to shape integration (Alter, 1998; Stone Sweet &
Brunell, 2012). There is a range of institutional factors that determines the power struggle between the
member states and the CJEU. While the CJEU has control of the EU jurisprudence, the member states have
the power over both legislation and who sits in the CJEU. As for judicial appointment, the main mechanism
in this thesis, the field is sadly under-researched. Some research (Frankenreiter, 2017) has indicated that
there may be a politicization of the judges, but more research needs to be conducted. The thesis proceeds
by further examining judicial control mechanisms as a way for member states to express ”voice”. To
properly shed light on judicial appointment as a court-curbing mechanism, the following sections describe
and discuss the CJEU, the Court’s working methods, and individual judges’ role in decision-making. It
provides the fundamental facts for each of these topics.
2.3 The Court of Justice of the European Union: Working Methods, Cham-
bers, and Judge Rapporteurs
The responsibility of the CJEU has been clear since its founding. According to the Treaty establishing the
European Community, the CJEU is to make sure that ”in the interpretation and application of the Treaties
the law is observed” (Treaty establishing the European Community, 1992). In its mission, the CJEU is
mandated to review EU legal acts, monitor member state compliance of treaties, and support national
courts with the interpretation of legal acts. The CJEU’s work is carried out in two courts: The Court of
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Justice of the European Union and the General Court. In the CJEU sit 27 judges, one from each member
state, and eleven advocate generals. Both judges and advocate generals are appointed by their national
government on six-year-long mandates that are renewable. Also, each member state appoints two judges to
the General Court. The requirements of the members of the Court are defined through the Treaty of Rome:
”The Judges and Advocates-General shall be chosen from persons whose independence is beyond doubt
and who possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their
respective countries or who are jurisconsults of recognized competence [...]” (Treaty of the Functioning of
the European Union, Art. 253, 2012). Thus, the members are not only required to be highly competent and
respected in their area, but they are also required to be independent of outside influence.
The most central aspect of the Court in this analysis is the working methods of the Court. In the
Court, decisions are made by consensus in chambers. Depending on the case at hand, the number of judges
in a chamber changes. There are four different chambers: the full Court, the Grand Chamber (15 judges),
or a chamber with five or three judges. The general number of judges dealing with a case is five (Rules of
Procedure of the Court of Justice, 2012). Each chamber is headed by a chamber president. Also, some
judges have expertise in certain legal areas. Thus, depending on the topic of the case some chambers are
more likely to handle certain types of cases. The Court makes decisions through majority voting to deliver
a decision based on consensus. Every judge advocates their preferred position and interpretation of EU
jurisprudence in reference to the case at hand. In contrast to other constitutional courts, the CJEU does not
release any information on how individual judges have voted or reasoned in a case. The Court only releases
the consensus opinion, through which it is not possible to discern individual judges’ opinions.
In addition to the judges, there are two roles that are important to consider in the case procedure.
Every case handled by the Court is assigned an Advocate General and a Judge Rapporteur. The advocate
general prepares decisions for judges but does not decide in court cases (European Union, 2012). In many
cases, the advocate general also releases an opinion (draft judgement) on the case (Court of Justice of the
European Union, 2012). The judge rapporteur is responsible for compiling a draft judgement that is then
circulated among the other judges in the chamber. Due to a high workload on the Court, work is often
delegated and divided between the judges. For every case, one of the judges in the chamber is assigned to
be responsible for drafting up a decision. This judge is called the judge rapporteur. The judges comment on
the draft and after a discussion among the judges (délibérés), the draft is accepted as the official decision of
the Court. The role of the judge rapporteur is of particular interest in this research. Following this
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description of the Court and its working methods, the next section covers research on the judges and judge
rapporteurs.
2.4 Judges’ Role in Decision-Making
In recent years, scholars have begun examining the working methods more closely and have found that
while the chambers collectively make decisions on rulings, some actors may have more influence over the
process than others. Some studies have used these actors to further investigate the CJEU. Additionally, de
Witte (2008), for example, finds that there exists a nationally colored outlook on EU law. Frankenreiter
(2017) analyzes judge rapporteurs citing behavior in court cases and finds that they cite previous judgments
from judges that correlate with the political stance of their member states. Frankenreiter (2017) concludes
that even though the Court makes decisions through consensus, the judge rapporteur has more control over
which previous cases are cited and how legislation is drafted than previously thought.
However, there is still uncertainty on how much influence the individual rapporteurs have over the
decision-making and outcome in the Court. Furthermore, some scholars suggest that individual judges
more often may be part of chambers that makes decisions in a particular direction. Larsson and Naurin
(2018b) use outcome in the Court to create ”net scores” for more Europe or less Europe for all judges. In
their analysis, ”less Europe” means the Court decides that the national legislation should be applied in a
case. ”More Europe” means the Court decides that EU law should apply. They showed that there is a
difference in the number of cases for or against Europe between the judges e.i. that some judges are more
often part of a chamber that decides in a particular direction. The discovery may suggest that some judges
more actively make decisions that limit member state sovereignty, and some make decisions that strengthen
member state sovereignty. However, the judges are not necessarily agents of the member states, but rather
makes decisions based on their individual opinion on policy. Furthermore, Larsson and Naurin (2018a)
examine disagreement between actors in the Court and investigate whether these are connected to the
appointment of judges. They analyze how often a member state agrees with the Court and if this depends
on the ideological leaning of the member state. Their analysis shows a weak effect of ideology on member
state agreement with the Court. Finally, a neighboring actor is the advocate general. Frankenreiter (2018)
analyses advocate generals and their appointing governments and find that the advocate generals’ opinions
correlate with the political preferences of the appointing governments. The advocate general gives an
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opinion on the case and Frankenreiter (2018) discovered that the advocate general assigned in a case has a
significant impact on the outcome in the court.
One aspect of judge behavior that needs to be lifted is the effect of socialization of judges and
advocate generals in the Court. In terms of EU institutions, scholars have examined the socialization effect
of national and EU institutions on individuals. For example, Vauchez (2012) takes a sociological approach
and writes that the CJEU works to build a transnational judicial community that socializes the European
judicial community. The author argues that there exists a ’social fabric’ in the Court that inoculates the
community with the values of the Court, thus keeping the core values and identity of the Court intact as
new members arrive. The result is that despite coming from diverging legal traditions, the new members of
the Court are quickly socialized to a European mindset, rather than a national. Vauchez’s (2012) claims
strengthen the argument for the CJEU as a strong agent where any preference that new members to the
Court bring in with them are quickly replaced. However, this claim is debated. An opposite argument
comes from Hooghe (2005) who writes that due to the high age, the extensive (often) national education
and training individuals go through before entering an EU institution, any significant socialization is most
likely to occur before an individual enters an EU institution. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that their
values are established before entering the Court (Hooghe, 2005). This means that judges most likely
establish values before being appointed to the Court and rather express previously established values while
working in the Court. The member states thus have an advantage selecting judges that previously have
expressed values that are in line with their preferences because they are most likely to remain when the
judge enters the court. By selecting such judges, the member states have an opportunity to affect EU legal
decision-making from within. The implication of these discoveries is that an individual judge may affect
the Court and that the working methods of the Court might not protect it from court-curbing mechanisms as
well as scholars previously thought. If individuals have the power to shape how and what decisions are
made, member state governments have an opportunity to influence the Court to their advantage through the
appointment of judges who sympathize with the appointing government.
To summarize these sections, some scholars have observed that individual judges may play an
important part in decision-making. Scholars like Frankenreiter (2017) have observed that judges may
influence the Court through the role as the judge rapporteur. Also, some evidence has been put forward for
a politicization of other EU-institutions. Lastly, due to their high age and education, socialization theories
suggest that judges may form their preferences outside of the CJEU. With preferences forming outside of
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the Court, member states have an opportunity to select judges that previously have expressed preferences in
line with their own.
2.5 Take-aways and Hypotheses
A range of institutional factors affects the power struggle between the member states and the CJEU. While
the CJEU has control of the EU jurisprudence, the member states have the power over legislation and who
sits in the CJEU. However, the effectiveness of these control mechanisms has not been conclusive. This
inconclusiveness is particularly great with respect to the appointment powers of member states to the CJEU.
While some research has indicated that there may be a politicization of the judges, others contest this. This
opens up a research agenda: do member states use their appointment power to politicize the CJEU?
One assumption moving forward is that there is an attempt from every member state to influence
the Court. This is a simplification with implications because, in practice, it is unlikely that all member
states try to influence the Court. This assumption, however, is difficult to avoid since it is difficult to
control for asymmetrical attempts to influence the Court. Suppose then that there might one or a few
member states that influence the Court. If this little group of member states has a large effect the analysis
may show a connection between member states and judges. The conclusion might be that all member states
influence the Court, while there are only a few. At the same time, the opposite conclusion may be drawn
from a negative outcome showing no connection. If a few member states try to influence the Court, these
attempts may be canceled out by the member states that do not attempt to influence the Court. Keeping the
research question in mind, if there is a politicization of the Court, a positive or negative result may not be
strong enough to confirm or disprove that member states generally influence the Court.
Most research operationalizes ”politicization” in dichotomous/partisan terms. In the American
context, was the appointing president a Democrat or a Republican? In the European context, it is useful to
be more fine-grained since it is not presidents who appoint judges, but governments. Therefore, it is also
necessary to consider how coalition governments would impact judge selection. It may be that selection of
judges is done through a discussion among the coalition parties. It might also be that in a government, the
party that nominates the prime minister has more influence over governmental appointments compared to
the others in the coalition. Furthermore, in the European context, it may not be partisanship, but rather
ideology in the shape of attitude towards European integration that matters. The European parties adhere to
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a range of different ideological traditions, but as I will later show, the attitude towards European integration
varies, even within party families. The question is what should be defined as ideology? Since this thesis
sets out to explore the impact on European integration, the government’s position on European integration
seems suitable for my purposes. Another measure of ideology may be left/right position. However, it is
difficult to predict what effect left/right positions have on European integration outcomes. In some areas,
the left is more pro-Europe (e.g. social policy). In others, the right is more pro-Europe (e.g. market
liberalization). Therefore, using ideology in the form of left/right position as a predictor of European
integration may not be as straightforward as using a position on European integration. There should
certainly be a discussion of left/right position of appointing governments and judicial appointments.
However, it will not take place here. An additional factor is what time of ideology is important to tap; the
time of appointment, or the time of ruling? On one hand, the time of appointment is important since the
ruling government has such a large authority over the judicial appointment. Assuming governments select
judges that express governments’ preferences, it is reasonable to assume that the judge continues to express
these preferences even after a change in government. On the other hand, if the judges are considered
”agents” of the member states, then it is expected that judges are loyal to the ruling government, and the
judge’s allegiance changes as home government changes. Yet, moving forward, I will go with the later
assumption that judges remain loyal to the appointing governments. The following hypotheses with
European integration as an independent variable are formulated:
Hypothesis 2.1. A chamber with a high European integration position score is more likely to make court
decisions for more Europe.
One additional factor, important for European integration, is the salience of these issues for
member states. European political issues rank differently in a member state. For EU saliency, it is
reasonable to expect that in a country where EU issues are a high priority, the willingness of a government
to impact the EU is higher. In some countries, European issues take more space in the domestic political
debate. In a country where European issues are in greater focus, the willingness of the government to
influence the Court is assumed to be higher compared to a country where European issues are not in focus.
If European issues have a high salience in a country then it can be expected that the government invests
more in European issues, such as judicial appointments. The effect of European integration may be
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stronger for a judge from a country where EU issues are more salient. The following hypothesis is
formulated for both chambers and individual judge rapporteurs:
Hypothesis 2.2. A chamber with a high EU salience score is more likely to make court decisions
consistent with its views on European integration.
Most (U.S.-American-informed) research focuses on the politicization of individual judges. The
CJEU consensus (and secrecy) rules require a more fine-grained approach. It is more difficult to examine
individual CJEU judges’ opinions. The only opinion available is through the judge rapporteurs. However,
the position of the judge rapporteur is not enough. It is also necessary to examine chamber position, even if
this is difficult since decisions are taken through consensus in chambers. When examining chambers, one
aspect that might play a role in decision-making is chamber cohesiveness. One fruitful way is to model the
cohesion of a chamber, which may be an intervening variable. For the chamber, it is reasonable to expect
that in a cohesive chamber, e.i. a chamber where judges were appointed by governments with similar
positions, it is easier to reach decisions. Thus, the effect of a European integration position may be stronger
in cohesive chambers. The following hypothesis is formulated:
Hypothesis 2.3. A chamber with a high cohesiveness is more likely to decide consistent with its views on
European integration.
Having summed up the takeaway of the theory and defined the three main hypotheses, I proceed by




The following section outlines the design of the empirical analysis applied to examine the
connection between government positions, judicial appointments, and integration outcomes in the Court.
The rationale behind the analysis is described graphically in figures 3.1 and 3.2. Figure 3.1 shows the
connection between governments and judges. If governments use judge appointments to politicize the
Court, then government positions would be reflected in the behavior of the judges. In the analysis, the
judge position is the same as the government that appointed the judge and the government position is
constructed from the position of the parties in the government. Figure 3.2 shows how government position
though judge position can affect European integration. In a chamber, the judges’ positions are aggregated
into a chamber position and this position is examined to find out if it influences the outcome in European
integration.
Figure 3.1: The potential politicization of a judge by a coalition government.
The methodology consists of four steps. First, the active judges during 1997-2008 are identified
and each judge is matched with respective parties in the appointing government. Second, a score on the
independent variables: European integration and EU salience position sourced from the Chapel Hill Expert
Survey (CHES) data set are given to the parties, the scores are put together to get the appointing
government’s score for each independent variable, and each judge is given the matching appointing
government score on the independent variables. Third, the active judges are then matched to the respective
Figure 3.2: The politicization of decisions in the Court by chamber position on European integration.
court case and active judges’ positions are aggregated in a chamber value for each case. Fourth, an ordered
logistic regression analysis is conducted with the unit of observation being the CJEU chambers. To conduct
the above-described analysis, I created a dataset that matches appointing governments with active judges in
the Court. I use the CHES (Bakker et al., 2015; Polk et al., 2017) and the Ray-Marks-Steenbergen Expert
Survey for the stance of governments/parties on European integration. This information is then used
together with data from Naurin et al. (2013) on court rulings. The dependent variable is the rulings for or
against European integration in the Court. The independent variables are the chamber position on
European integration, EU salience, and chamber cohesiveness.
3.1 Step One: Matching Appointing Governments with Judges
In step one, I construct a dataset that contains information on the appointing governments and judges. This
dataset matches the judges in the CJEU with the governments that appointed them. This dataset is unique
to this study and a dataset of this kind has not been constructed or used before to be used in analyzing the
decisions in the Court. The dataset contains information on 42 judges active in the Court between 1997 and
2008. The information is sourced from the CJEU webpage, and Commission and Council press releases.
For every judge, the following variables are recorded: the country of origin, starting date, end date,
appointment announcement, the corresponding government parties, and the largest party in government at
least three months before judge appointment. This dataset allows me to merge the court decision data with
the government position by matching the acting judge with the correct government position at a specific
time.
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3.2 StepTwo: ScoringGovernments onEuropean integration andEUSalience
After constructing a judge dataset, the corresponding values on the politicizing variables are assigned to
each government. A suitable source of this information is the Chapel Hill Expert Survey together
Ray-Marks-Steenbergen Survey, which provides party position data. The datasets contain expert estimates
of European party positioning on a range of issues. The CHES started collecting data in 1999 but can be
used together with the predecessor, the Ray-Marks-Steenbergen survey, which covers the years 1984-1996.
I merge these two datasets to create a trend file on European party position ranging between 1982-2008.
The main variables of importance to this analysis are the position on European integration and EU
salience. These are estimated by the survey’s experts. Additionally, the dataset contains information when
these parties were in government, and what share of votes they received following elections. The European
integration variable is named position and measures the party leadership’s position on European integration,
coded 1 for ”strongly opposed” to 7 ”strongly in favor”. EU salience is measured through a variable called
EU_salience and it measures the salience of European integration in the public stance of the party, coded 0
for ”European Integration is of no importance, never mentioned” to 10 for ”European Integration is the
most important issue”. The corresponding party value is given to each party that was part of an appointing
government. From these variables, it is possible to create a political profile of the chambers in the CJEU by
matching the judges with the political profile of the governments that appointed them.
3.3 Step Three: Matching Judges with Court Cases
In the third step, I make use of court data from Naurin et al. (2013). The dataset from Naurin et al. (2013)
contains 3870 questions asked to the CJEU between 1997 to 2008. The court data consists of cases from
the preliminary reference procedure. The procedure is outlined graphically in figure 3.3 and can be
described as follows. The cases from the preliminary reference procedure arise from private litigants
challenging the compliance of national laws with EU law. Generally, the national court then refers the case
to the CJEU which in turn reviews the case and provides a preliminary ruling. The main reason for this
mechanism is to ensure that EU law is applied uniformly across all member states. At the same time, the
procedure gives the CJEU authority over interpretation which is described as ”an indirect form of
supranational judicial review of national law” (Larsson and Naurin, 2016, p. 392).
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Figure 3.3: The preliminary ruling procedure: private litigants challenge the compliance of national laws
with EU law, and the national courts refer the case to the CJEU that offers a preliminary ruling.
The court data offers a broader set of variables than previously used in other analyses. The dataset
addresses the difficulty in defining the impact of a court decision on European integration. The dataset
remedies this by using the questions submitted by national courts to the CJEU and the outcome as measures
of a decision’s impact on European integration. A question arises when litigants challenges an
inconsistency in national law and EU law. The national court then refers the case to the CJEU and asks
which legislation should be applied in that particular case. If the CJEU’s preliminary ruling is that the
national legislation should be applied, then that court decision is coded as ”less Europe” translated as less
European integration. If EU law applies, then that court decision is coded ”more Europe” meaning more
European integration. For some decisions, a clear more Europe or less Europe cannot be determined.
These cases are given a neutral coding. The variable is coded -1 for less Europe, 0 for a neutral outcome,
and 1 for more Europe. Table 3.1 shows the frequency of outcome in cases.
Table 3.1: The distribution in the variable ecj_intmeasuring court decision outcome in European integration.
Decision Code Frequency Share (%)
Less Europe -1 972 25.12
Neutral 0 1,499 38.73
More Europe 1 1,399 36.15
Total 3,870 100.00
Additionally, beneficial for my purposes, the dataset includes who is judge rapporteur, the
composition of judges in the chambers, which member states have submitted observations to the Court, and
what position the member states took. The main variables in the Naurin et al. (2013) dataset are CJEU
decision, MS Pro, MS Anti. MS Pro is a measure of the share of Council votes for more Europe and ranges
between 0-1. MS Anti measures the vote in the Council for more national sovereignty and ranges between
0-1.
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3.4 Step Four: Merging Datasets, Creating Variables, and Matching Values
The first step in merging the datasets is to give the parties their respective value on European integration,
EU salience, and share of votes in the most recent election prior to (but at least three months before) the
appointment of a judge. This information comes from the merged CHES and Ray-Marks-Steenbergen
survey. To account for a coalition, a weighted coalition score is calculated. For coalitions, the independent
variables are weighted by the parties’ share in the government. Each party’s share in government is
calculated and is then multiplied with the party’s score on each independent variable. The equation below
is a generic description of how a weighted score is calculated.
As an example, this is the calculation for the weighted score on European integration for the judge
Ad Geelhoed. According to the CJEU webpage, he was appointed as a judge to the Court of Justice on July
26th, 2000. The most recent election before his appointment was on May 6th, 1998. The parties in
government after the election in 1998 (e.i. those who elected him as a judge) were PvdA, VVD, and D66.
The election gave the party PvdA 29 %, the party VVD 24,7 %, and the party D66 9 %. The prime minister
came from the party PvdA. The total share of votes received in the election by the parties in government
was 62.7 %. After the 1998 election, the CHES scored PvdA a 6.55, VVD a 5.45, and D66 a 6.64 on
European integration position.
Thus, for the weighted score, for PvdA the calculation is:
% PvdA share in election




= 0.463 = 46.3%
. In other words, the European integration position for PvdA=6.55 should account for 46.3 % of the
coalition’s total European integration score: 0.463 · 6.55 = 3.03. For VVD the calculation is:
% V V D share in election




= 0.394 = 39.4%
. In other words, the European integration position for VVD=5.45 should account for 39.4 % of the
coalition’s total European integration score: 0.394 · 5.45 = 2.16. For D66 the calculation is:
% D66 share in election




= 0.144 = 14.4%
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. In other words, the European integration position for D66=6.64 should account for 14.4 % of the
coalition’s total European integration score: 0.144 · 6.64 = 0.96. All values are added together and to
make up the weighted coalition score: 3.03 + 2.16 + 0.96 = 6.15.
The values on all independent variables are calculated and recorded for all judges. In the next step,
these values are matched in the court case data. In the data from Larsson and Naurin (2016), there is
information on which judges were seated in each case. The data contains a dummy variable for all
countries that describes from which country the judges are from. Furthermore, the case data contains
information on the date a case was lodged. From my constructed dataset I know which judge is active
when and and which national government appointed them. This data is then matched so that each judge is
given a score on European integration and EU salience by constructing a variable for each independent
variable and judge. The variable values were replaced by the corresponding value that matched the judge at
the time with the court case was lodged.
Following the matching over government values to the judges, the mean chamber score is then
created through the Stata command rowmean(). The command calculates the observation mean row value
for each of these variables by combining the values of the active judges in a chamber. Additionally, the
data includes which judge rapporteur that was responsible for drafting. The analysis is then conducted
using the score of the judge rapporteur. The score is recorded in a variable by assigning each observation
the individual judge rapporteur score and not the total chamber score.
A way to measure chamber cohesiveness is to examine the standard deviation of the European
integration position in a chamber. Standard deviation is a measure of dispersion in a variable. If values are
more similar, then the standard deviation is low. If values are spread out, then the standard deviation is
high. To calculate the chamber standard deviation, the Stata command rowsd() is employed. The command
functions in a similar manner as the rowmean()command described above but instead of calculating the
row mean value, it calculates the row standard deviation. The chamber standard deviation is recorded in a
variable called ei_sd for chamber standard-deviation in the European integration position. The variable is
inversely proportional, which means a small standard deviation indicates high chamber cohesiveness.
Due to a lack of data, some values have been excluded from the analysis. The value for Italy before
2000 has been excluded. This is because data before 1979, the year the government that appointed the
judge was elected, was unavailable. The earliest values available for Malta, Cyprus, and Lithuania are from
2010, which is too late for this analysis. These countries are excluded from this analysis. The impact of
21
missing values must be taken into consideration when interpreting the results. They have an impact on the
average chamber value, especially in chambers with few members.
3.5 Step Five: Ordered Logistic Regression Analysis
The four components necessary for analysis are available through the combination of the three datasets.
The first component is court cases with the corresponding outcome for European integration. The second is
which judges decide in the Court. The third component is which government/party appointed those judges.
The fourth component is what position these governments take on European integration. The final dataset,
consisting of court data between 1999-2008 from Naurin et al. (2013) matched with party position data
from Bakker et al. (2015), Polk (2017), and Ray-Marks-Steenbergen (1996) is then analyzed using the
ordered logistic regression.
As mentioned, the main purpose of the analysis is to investigate whether an ideology position in
the form of European integration position (x) affects the impact of court decisions on European integration
(y) among a sample of court decisions (N ≈ 3, 800). The independent variable European integration
position is treated as an interval variable and is coded 1 (strongly opposed) to 7 (strongly in favor). The
dependent variable is coded -1 for ”less Europe”, 0 for a neutral outcome, and 1 for ”more Europe”. The
independent variables are the appointing government position on European integration and the saliency of
the EU in the Party. The dependent variable in the analysis is the court case outcome in the Court for or
against European integration. Control variables are the measures of government observations submitted in
the case and the size of the chamber. All analysis is done with court cases lodged between 1996 and 2008,
and analysis is performed using Stata 15.1. In the section that follows, I present the descriptive statistics of
the variables used for analysis.
3.6 Descriptive Statistics
The following part of this paper describes in greater detail the variables that are used in the analysis. It
shows if there is a difference in values for judges and chambers on the independent variables. Additionally,
the independent variables are sorted and described by countries and years. The main takeaway from these
figures is that there is that European integration position is stable over the analysed years while EU salience
increases steadily.
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For European integration, displayed in figure 3.4, the country means vary between 4.25 and 6.80
for the coalition value and for the prime minister value between 4.25 and 7. The most Eurosceptic is the
UK, and the most pro-Europe is Austria. The bar graph shows that there is a difference between the prime
minister party value and the coalition value. However, the difference in opinion towards European
integration is generally low. The largest difference is in Romania where the coalition score is about 2
points lower than the prime minister party score. Examining the variable over the years in figure 3.5, the
chamber means on European integration are generally increasing over time. However, the increase is small,
almost flat, meaning a continuity in position on European integration. Figure 3.5 also illustrates that there
is a difference between the coalition and the prime minister values where the prime minister values are
generally more varied in the late 1990s and the coalition scores are generally more varied in the late 2000s.
Figure 3.4: While there is a variance in the judges mean position on European integration between countries,
chamber and prime minister party values are similar.
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Figure 3.5: Aggregated chamber position on European integration remains stable during 1997-2008.
For EU salience displayed figure 3.6 there is a difference between the countries. The country
where EU issues are most salient is in Slovakia, scoring about 9.8 on EU salience, while in the Netherlands,
EU salience is the lowest, scoring about 3. The trend in the data is that salience is generally higher in the
eastern countries than in the western. Comparing values over the years in figure 3.6, the mean score on
European integration salience increase between 1996 and 2008. This shows that over time that EU politics
becomes more salient for parties. Also, as shown if figure 3.7 there is a large spread between chambers.
The largest variance is in 2007 where chamber values differ from 4 and 9.5.
Moving to the summary of variables for chambers and judge rapporteurs in tables 3.2 and 3.3.
First, the difference in the coalition and prime minister party scores in table 3.2. Generally, there is little
difference in mean score for all independent variables if one compares the coalition and prime minster
party means. The largest difference is in the interaction variables where the largest difference is in the
European integration chamber cohesiveness where the difference between the scores is about 0.6.
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Figure 3.6: Judges mean salience on European integration by country varies with a large difference between
the mean scores, and the chamber and prime minister party values are generally large.
Furthermore, the standard deviation is marginally higher for the prime minster variables. Second,
considering the judge rapporteur scores. For the judge rapporteurs, it is mainly the standard deviation of
the mean scores that is significant. As expected, for the judge rapporteurs, the difference between the
judges is larger, meaning that the judges are generally more different from each other compared to the
chambers who are comparably similar. In turn, this could mean that if the individual judge rapporteurs
have an impact on the outcome, the outcome should vary more between judge rapporteurs then chambers.
Generally about the variables. The chamber and judge rapporteur mean scores on European
integration of around 6 suggest that governments that appoint judges are generally pro-Europe. From the
mean score for EU salience, chambers have a medium salience compared to EU issues. While the central
tendency is around the middle range of values, it is important to note that all variables are dispersed and
that both chambers and judge rapporteurs positions vary.
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Figure 3.7: Chamber salience on European integration increase during the 1997-2008 period.
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Table 3.2: Summary of variables for the chambers.
Variable Mean SD Range N
European Integration Outcome — — -1-1 3,837
European integration position (Prime Minister Party) 6.187 0.425 0-7 3,837
European integration position (Coalition) 6.074 0.314 0-7 3,837
EU Salience (Prime Minister Party) 5.409 1.490 0-10 3,837
EU Salience (Coalition) 5.106 1.261 0-10 3,837
Chamber cohesiveness (Prime Minister Party) 0.690 0.439 0.023-2.475 3,788
Chamber cohesiveness (Coalition) 0.726 0.439 0-2.475 3,799
European integration x EU Salience (Prime Minister party) 33.862 10.791 0-70 3,837
European integration x EU Salience (Coalition) 31.220 8.645 0-70 3,837
European integration x Chamber cohesiveness (Prime Minister Party) 32.647 4.305 0-70 3,837
European integration x Chamber cohesiveness (Coalition) 33.212 4.486 0-70 3,837
Control variables
MS Pro 0.276 0.609 0-10 3,837
MS Anti 0.653 0.948 0-10 3,837
Chamber Size 6.436 3.318 2-28 3,869
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Table 3.3: Summary of independent variables for the judge rapporteurs.
Variable Mean SD Range N
European integration position (Prime Minister Party) 6.120 0.873 0-7 3,186
European integration position (Coalition) 6.051 0.769 0-7 3,286
EU Salience (Prime Minister Party) 5.406 2.230 0-10 3,186
EU Salience (Coalition) 5.103 1.993 0-10 3,286
European integration x EU Salience (Prime Minister party) 33.947 16.480 0-70 3,186




The three hypotheses previously stated, aims to explore if there is a relationship between
governments position on European integration and outcome for European integration. The correlation
between government position and integration outcome was tested with ordered logistic regression using the
three datasets mentioned above.
Starting with hypothesis 2.1: a chamber with a high European integration position score is more
likely to make court decisions for more Europe. First, I consider the analysis with a weighted coalition in
table 4.1. The results, as shown in Table 4.1, indicate that in model 1a and 1b, the chamber European
integration position has a positive effect on the decision for European integration outcome. This result is
significant at the p=0.05 level. In model 1a, a one-step increase in chamber European integration position
is associated with a 49.6 % increase in likelihood for a decision for more European integration. The effect
remains when control variables are introduced in model 1b. The Prop>F value of 0.0179 shows that the
whole model is statistically significant. However, the R-value of 0.0043 in model 1a suggests that the
explanatory power of the model is weak and only explains about 0.1 % of the variation. The effect is
graphed out in figure 4.1. The graph shows that as chamber European integration positon increase, the
predicted probability of a ”less Europe” outcome decreases constantly, about 8 % per one step increase in
European integration position. The predicted probability of ”neutral” increases with about 6 % per one step
increase until European integration position reaches 4, then the curve becomes flat. ”More Europe”
outcome increases exponentially, with a 4 % increase in the lower European integration scores, to about 8
% in the higher scores.
Turning to the prime minister values in Table 4.2. In the same models 1a and 1b, the positive and
significant effect at the p=0.05 level remains but the effect is weaker. A one-step increase in chamber
European integration position is associated with a 28.8% increase in likelihood for a court decision for
more European integration. Again, while the Prop>F value makes for a statistically significant model at
the p=0.05 level, the low R-value shows that the model has low explanatory power, only 0.12 % of the
variation.
For judge rapporteurs in Table 4.3, in models 1a and 1b, analysis shows no effect of judge
rapporteurs position on the outcome for European integration in the Court. Taken together, there is some
evidence for the first hypothesis that a chamber with a high European integration position score is more
likely to make court decisions for more Europe. However, there is no evidence that the position of the
judge rapporteur has an effect.
Turning to hypothesis 2.2: a chamber with a high EU salience score is more likely to make court
decisions consistent with its views on European integration. This hypothesis is tested in models 2(a, b) and
3(a, b) in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. Starting with the coalition values in Table 4.1, in model 2a the effect of
European integration position remains positive and statistically significant. EU salience is shown to have a
negative and significant effect at the p=0.05 level. For EU salience, a one-step increase decreases the
likelihood of a decision for more Europe by about 7.7 %. The effect remains the same when conducting the
analysis with control variables. This finding shows that EU salience depresses a chamber’s willingness to
make a decision for ”more Europe”. For the hypothesis to be confirmed, there must be an observed
interaction effect between the European integration position and EU salience. In models 3a and 3b, the
relationship is tested but no significant effect can be found where European integration position and EU
salience interact to affect court outcome for European integration. Since interaction effects between
continuous variables are difficult to show only through regression analysis, to further investigate if there is
an interaction effect I produce a graph of predicted probabilities of court outcome by European integration
position and EU salience in figure 4.2. EU salience is divided into three groups consisting of one-third
percentiles. The graph confirms the interpretation of the regression analysis. There is no difference in
predicted probability of European integration position between levels of chamber EU salience. EU salience
does not interact with European integration position to amplify any effect in the chambers.
Continuing with the prime minister party values, where again EU salience is negatively correlated
and significant and a step increase in EU salience is associated with about a 6.7 % decrease in probability
for a court outcome for more Europe. However, in model 2, the effect of the European integration position
is not significant. Similarly to the coalition values, while the direction and size of the effect of European
integration and EU salience variables, these variables and the interaction between European integration and
EU salience position are not significant. All models are shown to be statistically significant at the p=0.05
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level. However, the explanatory power is weak, less than 1 % without the control variables, and less than 5
% with them. For the judge rapporteur values in Table 4.3, models 3a, 3b, 4a, and 4b test the effect of the
judge rapporteur score on EU salience, and European integration is not found to have any effect on
European integration outcome. There is no evidence of an interaction effect between European integration
position and EU salience in any of the Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. Taken together, there is no evidence for the
second hypothesis that a chamber or a judge rapporteur with high EU salience score are more likely to
make court decisions consistent with their view on European integration.
Finally, hypothesis 2.3: a chamber with a high cohesiveness is more likely to decide consistent
with its views on European integration. Chamber cohesiveness as an interacting variable is only tested for
the chamber values in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. For the coalition values in Table 4.1, model 4 and 5.
Chamber cohesiveness is not statistically significant. Furthermore, there is no statistically significant effect
of the interaction variable. The same is true for the prime minister party values. Using prime minister party
values, chamber cohesiveness is not found to be statistically significant except in model 4b where it is
positively correlated with court outcome. Similarly, in models 5a and 5b, testing hypothesis 2.3 using the
interaction between European integration position and cohesion, there is no evidence for an interaction
effect. There is no evidence for the third hypothesis that a chamber with a high cohesiveness is more likely
to decide consistent with its views on European integration.
Overall, the results presented in table 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 show that while chamber European
integration position does in some cases have a positive and significant effect on court outcome, this effect
does not remain when it interacts with EU salience position and chamber cohesiveness. Taken together,
these results suggest that there is a weak association between government position and chamber position
(but not judge rapporteur position) and that this affects the outcome for European integration in the Court.
However, it is not found that the effect is strengthened by either EU salience or chamber cohesiveness.
Furthermore, the explanatory power is low in all models. The next chapter moves on to discuss these
results more in detail and discuss what they mean for the continuing academic discussion about European
integration and the CJEU’s part in it.
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Table 4.1: Results of ordered regression analysis, coalition values.
Model 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 5a 5b
European Integration 1.496*** 1.454** 1.426** 1.361** 1.164 1.052 1.325* 1.307* 1.166 1.100
(0.189) (0.192) (0.160) (0.157) (0.452) (0.422) (0.157) (0.162) (0.253) (0.246)
EU Salience 0.925** 0.932* .923** .928** 0.702 0.657
(0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.352) (0.339)
Cohesiveness 1.099 1.118 1.170 1.184 0.431 0.292
(0.114) (0.121) (0.118) (0.125) (0.615) (0.445)
EI x EU Salience 1.045 1.057
(0.085) (0.088)
EI x Cohesiveness 1.188 1.274
(0.292) (0.335)
MS Anti 0.758*** .751*** .751*** .759*** 0.759***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
MS Pro 2.984*** 3.015*** 3.017*** 2.993*** 2.990***
(0.214) (0.217) (0.217) (0.215) (0.215)
Chamber Size 0.995 0.999 1.000 0.995 0.992
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Prop>F 0.0043 0.0479 0.0021 0 0.0055 0 0.0569 0 0.1013 0
Pseudo R 0.0016 0 0.0015 0.0487 0.0015 0.0487 0.0007 0.0472 0.0008 0.0473
N 3,799 3,798 3,836 3,836 3,836 3,836 3,836 3,836 3,798 3,798
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Source: Bakker et al. (2015), Naurin et al. (2013), Polk et al (2017), Ray (1999), Steenbergen & Marks (2007)
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Table 4.2: Results of ordered regression analysis, prime minister party values.
Model 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 5a 5b
European Integration 1.288* 1.346** 1.155 1.176 1.735* 1.683 1.175 1.236 1.166 1.100
(0.146) (0.158) (0.105) (0.109) (0.481) (0.479) (0.126) (0.138) (0.253) (0.246)
EU Salience .931* .935* .933** 0.932** 1.715 1.591
(0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.674) (0.640)
Cohesiveness 1.110 1.161 1.220 1.270* 0.431 0.292
(0.122) (0.133) (0.126) (0.137) (0.615) (0.445)
EI x EU Salience 0.909 0.919
(0.056) (0.058)
EI x Cohesiveness 1.188 1.274
(0.292) (0.335)
MS_Anti 0.754*** 0.749*** .746*** 0.747*** .755***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
MS_Pro 2.992*** 3.014*** 3.014*** 3.001*** 2.990***
(0.216) (0.217) (0.217) (0.216) (0.215)
Chamber Size 0.995 1.001 1.000 0.995 0.992
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Prop>F 0.0179 0 0.0261 0 0.0213 0 0.1565 0 0.1013 0
Pseudo R 0.0012 0.0481 0.0009 0.0484 0.0012 0.0486 0.0005 0.0475 0.0008 0.0473
N 3,788 3,787 3,836 3,836 3,836 3,836 3,836 3,836 3,798 3,798
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Source: Bakker et al. (2015), Naurin et al. (2013), Polk et al (2017), Ray (1999), Steenbergen & Marks (2007)
33
Table 4.3: Results of ordered logistical regression analysis on the effect of judge rapporteurs where model a represent values for the coalition and
model b represent values for the prime minister party.
Model 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b
European Integration Position 0.999 1.024 0.988 0.869
(.046) (0.041) (0.126) (0.126)
EU Salience 1.001 0.995 0.986 0.726
(0.019) (0.017) (0.187) (0.179)
EI x EU Salience 1.002 1.049
(0.030) (0.040)
Control variables
MS Anti 0.750*** 0.751*** 0.750*** 0.751*** 0.750** 0.750*** 0.750*** 0.749***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
MS Pro 3.133*** 3.138*** 3.143*** 3.142*** 3.133*** 3.129*** 3.134*** 3.136***
(0.256) (0.257) (0.257) (0.257) (0.256) (0.256) (0.256) (0.257)
Chamber Size 0.991 0.991 0.990 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.991
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Prop>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Psuedo R2 0.0507 0.0508 0.0510 0.0510 0.0507 0.0507 0.0507 0.0511
N 2,839 2,839 2,839 2,839 2,839 2,839 2,839 2,839
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Source: Bakker et al. (2015), Naurin et al. (2013), Polk et al (2017), Ray (1999), Steenbergen & Marks (2007)
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Figure 4.1: Predicted probabilities of outcomes ”Less Europe”, ”Neutral”, and ”More Europe” for different
levels of chamber European integration position.
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Figure 4.2: Predicted probabilities of the outcomes ”Less Europe”, ”Neutral”, and ”More Europe” for dif-




This thesis takes up a core question in European integration theory: to what extent do member
states control EU decision making? In particular, I ask, do member states exert any control over arguably
the most independent and powerful European institution, the CJEU? I also focus on judicial appointment as
a lever for influence. I made use of the principal-agent theory to investigate and model this relationship
between the member states (principals) and the EU institutions (agents). Generally, two theoretical
perspectives are contrasted. First, a perspective that puts the agents in control: neofunctionalism. Second,
the perspective that puts the principals is in control: intergovernmentalism. One of the agents, the CJEU,
has proven to have great influence over the European integration process and is at the center of Weiler’s
theory of European integration that made use of the principal-agent perspective. Weiler’s theory described
the battle between member states and the CJEU, writing that European law, controlled by the CJEU, has
closed off the option to deviate from EU law (e.i. the option to ”exit”). To compensate, the member states
work hard to ensure that they have enough control over EU lawmaking (e.i. ”voice” in EU). A way for the
member states to express their ”voice” is by using court-curbing mechanisms such as judicial appointment
since the member states have control over who sits in the CJEU. Previous scholars have indicated that there
is a politicizing of the Court with a connection between appointing governments ideology and judges.
Furthermore, while decision-making is done in chambers, individual judges may play a more important
role in Court decisions than previously thought (Frankenreiter, 2017; Frankenreiter, 2018; Larsson &
Naurin, 2018b). Furthermore, the CJEU employs the most secretive working methods of all EU institutions.
The rationale and mechanics behind CJEU’s working methods are kept largely hidden from the public.
With court cases decided through chamber consensus, individual accountability of the judges is impossible
to claim. These secretive working methods in combination with few democratic checks, I argue, were a
hotbed for a politicization of the Court during the 1997-2008 period. The theory has concluded that there is
a tension between the member states and the CJEU. Therefore, I examine whether the member states
attempt to politicize the Court. If this is the case and governments appoint judges that mirror their political
position, then this should be mirrored in the decisions of the Court. To test this, the analysis makes use of
measures of politicization. The main measure of politicization was the appointing government’s
ideological position on European integration.
The results of this study show some connection between appointing government position and
outcome in the Court as stated in hypothesis 2.1. However, while there may be some connection between
chamber position and outcome in European integration, the low explanatory power of the model shows that
this connection is weak. Furthermore, strengthening the effect of government position by introducing the
variables EU salience and cohesiveness as interaction variables in hypotheses two and three did not show
any significant effect on outcome in the court. Further analysis on EU salience as an interaction variable
showed that while EU salience have constrain the court, this effect does not interact with chamber position
on European integration. However, the finding that EU salience decreases the probability of a
pro-European integration outcome goes against my expectations. Analysis shows that EU salience is rather
a constraint on European integration, not a fuel, a discovery that needs to be further analysed to be fully
understood. There appears to be a general association of EU salience on the Court’s behavior. However,
what this analysis can not parse out do is whether this is a reflection of EU-wide salience that exerts some
constraining effect on any court, or whether it is attached to appointment power. Additionally, if this is
effect of EU salience is consistent over time, as EU salience has increased the Court was more constrained
in the late 2000s. As for judge rapporteurs, it has been suggested that the positions of appointing
governments are reflected in the behavior of judges in the Court (Frankenreiter, 2017). This does not appear
to be the case, at least not in such a way that it affects European integration. The results of this analysis
goes against the findings of Frankereiter (2017) and Larsson & Naurin (2018). If the judge rapporteurs use
their position to affect drafting, their influence did not correlate with the appointing government’s position.
Returning to the question posed above: do member states use their appointment power to politicize
the CJEU? It is tempting to draw the conclusion from these findings that there is no politicization of the
Court. However, it is important to keep in mind what I am testing in this analysis. The dependent variable
is the outcome of cases for or against European integration. Thus, this analysis would only indicate the
politicization of the Court if there was a correlation between government position and Court outcome. It is
still possible that governments attempt to politicize the Court. However, there are some factors that speak
against it. First, one could expect that the corruption of judges is linked to a serious political risk, especially
in the EU. A member state’s systematic corruption of the CJEU would not be taken lightly by both the EU
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institutions and the other member states, and would be severely punished. Second, the idea that member
states work with plans in mind to influence European integration may also be too ambitious. As history has
shown, the effect of European integration has been difficult to predict. where one directed action leads to
one intended outcome and multiple unintended. How can a government determine that a potential judge
profile matches their preferences? A more possible prediction of member state behavior is that they are
more concerned about specific policies and cases rather than the larger course of European integration.
Third, the results that show a consistent statistically significant effect of member states’ submitted
observation seem to indicate that the member states can influence the Court through the legitimate
channels. With a possible legitimate channel to influence the Court, the use of a court-curbing mechanism
as judicial appointment may be less salient. Fourth, Kelemen (2012) predicts that the working methods of
the Court prevent politicization. While the secretive working methods may be criticized as undemocratic,
they are in place for a reason: to protect individual judges and reduce the possibility of politicization. The
non-results may be these working methods in action.
As for potential limitations of this study, the difference in how European integration is measured
between CHES and Naurin et. al. (2013) means that the two variables may not be suitable together. While
both measures of European integration are considered valid and reliable, they do measure European
integration differently. CHES captures a general expert opinion of party position on European integration
and Naurin et al (2013) capture if national or European law takes precedence. While these two measures
may correlate in some areas, in some other they may not. However, with few other alternatives, I have
strived to use the most reliable measures of European integration for my study. There are other variables in
the analysis that may have been used to capture these better. For example, the MS anti and MS pro
variables capture what opinion member states have submitted to the Court in each case. These variables are
thus likely more aligned with the exact position on each case far better than a general European integration
position. Although, using that approach the position of the appointing government is lost since positions
may change at elections. The purpose of the study was to examine the appointing government’s effect on
Court outcome.
Further research is needed to develop a full picture of how court-curing mechanisms may be used
in the European context. Additional studies are needed that strengthen the connection between judges and
governments. With a more qualitative approach, a researcher may be able to establish a relationship
between a judge and a government. Additionally, for quantitative studies, using a consistent measure of
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European integration both in outcome and position could also further improve the validity and reliability of
the research. While both measures used in the thesis are reliable measures, there is a difference in the
definition of European integration between them that can not be ignored. With few alternatives, future
research should address how to reduce the difference in measurement.
The purpose of this thesis was to further investigate if member states make use of judicial
appointment as a court-curbing mechanism as a way to express ”voice”. The present study questions the
efficacy of politicization of the CJEU through judicial appointment. While that does not mean that there
are no attempts to politicize the Court, in this study, only some evidence can be found that the position of
national governments and the decisions of CJEU judges correlate in a way that affects outcome in the
Court. The scholars that have criticized the CJEU of employing secretive working methods may rest a little
easier. As mentioned, there may well be a politicization of the Court, but since only a weak correlation can
be found, the working methods, as Kelemen (2012) suggests, might actually be what protects the CJEU
from politicization. In a time where national governments are being suppressed in Eastern Europe, the
possibility for a fair, unpoliticized trial may be achieved though a European court. Finally, to return to the
age-old question of who the drivers of integration are, these findings indicate that the CJEU is a driver of
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